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Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director
Tim Ramnitz, Attorney [Argued]
Office of Immigration Litigation
Civil Division
United States Department of Justice
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
Counsel for Respondent
____________
OPINION*
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Augustino Smith petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) denying his request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against
Torture (CAT). For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss the petition.
I
A native of Jamaica, Smith entered the United States lawfully in 1987 and became
a legal permanent resident. Ten years later, he was convicted of robbery and controlled
substance crimes in New Jersey and imprisoned. Smith was removed to Jamaica in 2002,
and after just two months there, he was assaulted by a group of men. After a conversation
about America, a man accused Smith of being gay, used “derogatory slurs,” and, along
with others nearby, “started beating [Smith] up.” App. 38. That night, Smith was kicked
out of his stepfather’s house for being, in his host’s words, “a faggot.” App. 39. Within
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
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days, Smith fled back to the United States and remained here undetected from 2002 to
2010.
In 2010, Smith was arrested and convicted for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b)(2). After spending five years in prison, Smith’s removal order was reinstated
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). He applied for, inter alia, deferral of removal under the
CAT. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied this request.
Smith appealed and the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, finding Smith “has not
demonstrated that, upon his removal, it is more likely than not that he will be tortured by
or with the acquiescence (including ‘willful blindness’) of a public official.” App. 7.
II1
Because Smith is removable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i) as an
aggravated felon and controlled substance offender, our review is limited to constitutional
and legal questions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D). Legal questions include “whether the
BIA used the correct standard in reviewing the IJ’s decision and whether the BIA
assigned to the petitioner the correct burden of proof.” Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333,
339 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted) (alterations omitted). We review legal questions de
novo. Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 2012).
III
The IJ had jurisdiction to determine Smith’s eligibility for CAT protection and
the BIA had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e). We generally
review the BIA’s opinion as a final agency decision, but where, as here, the BIA “invokes
specific aspects of the IJ’s analysis and fact-finding,” we review both decisions. Green v.
Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
1
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Smith claims the BIA erred when it affirmed the IJ’s decision denying him CAT
relief. Under the implementing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18, an alien may not be
removed to a country where “it is more likely than not that [he] will be tortured.” GomezZuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 349 (3d Cir. 2008). Whether torture will likely
occur depends on two questions: “(1) what is likely to happen to the petitioner if
removed; and (2) does what is likely to happen amount to the legal definition of torture?”
Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010). The first is an unreviewable
factual question, but the second is a cognizable legal question. The legal definition of
torture requires, among other things, acquiescence in the activity by the relevant
government. See Green, 694 F.3d at 507.
Smith claims the BIA’s “legal analysis is fatally flawed” for several reasons.
Smith Br. 17. We will address his principal arguments in turn.
A
Smith first argues that the IJ and BIA erred by failing to discuss whether the
Jamaican government acquiesced in his 2002 beating. See Smith Br. 21 (claiming the
BIA “fail[ed] to mention, or even account for, [his] evidence that police officers
witnessed, but took no action to prevent, the severe beating he suffered in 2002”).
Although the IJ and BIA did not specifically discuss the police officers near the
2002 altercation, it is inaccurate to say they did not consider that fact. After Smith
testified at his hearing, “when I was being attacked the police [were] there and did
nothing,” the IJ responded, “I understand that and I appreciate all the documents that you
4
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submitted and your testimony today.” App. 104. The IJ went on to cite the correct
standard for government acquiescence in torture and concluded that the 2002 beating was
not “torture by the government in any way, shape, or form.” App. 40. The BIA likewise
“recognize[d] the applicant’s testimony regarding the incident of harm” before agreeing it
wasn’t probative of the likelihood of future torture. App. 7.
More importantly, the IJ found (and the BIA agreed) that the country conditions
were such that the Jamaican government was unlikely to participate or acquiesce in any
future torture of Smith. The IJ specifically discussed country conditions, finding they
have improved. See App. 41 (noting the “significant strides” taken since the Ninth
Circuit’s finding in Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008), that Jamaican
country conditions were egregious towards gay men in 2005). The IJ found that while
“there’s still discrimination and bullying . . . by members of the general public in
Jamaica,” and the police need to do more, “individual police officers [have] express[ed]
sympathy for the plight of the LGBT community and [are] work[ing] to prevent and
resolve instances of abuse.” App. 42. Therefore, the IJ concluded Smith “has not met his
burden” with respect to the likelihood of the government’s involvement in torturing
LGBT individuals. Id.
The IJ and BIA also correctly stated the level of government involvement
necessary for torture under the CAT—the government must be willfully blind to or
acquiesce in the requisite treatment, Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 70 (3d Cir.
2007)—before concluding the government’s actions would not meet this threshold. After
5
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mentioning Jamaica’s country conditions and Smith’s past experience, the BIA found that
the “discrimination, harassment, and occasional acts of violence” in Jamaica were
insufficient to produce the requisite likelihood of torture. App. 7. The BIA affirmed the
IJ’s decision on this point, finding the IJ “properly considered the applicant’s claim, and
properly concluded that he did not meet his burden.” Id.
It appears that Smith’s real dispute with respect to the police incident is with the
IJ’s and BIA’s determination that the government is not likely to acquiesce in torture
upon his return. On his view, the 2002 beating coupled with the country evidence about
violence toward LGBT individuals in Jamaica is enough to demonstrate a sufficient
likelihood of torture under the CAT standard. But the IJ and BIA weighed the evidence
differently, and assertions “that an Immigration Judge or the BIA incorrectly weighed
evidence [or] failed to consider evidence . . . are not questions of law under
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).” Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted). Thus, we don’t have jurisdiction to review the IJ’s and BIA’s determination that
the Jamaican government is not likely to acquiesce in any torture of Smith. See Green,
694 F.3d at 507.
Since the IJ and BIA reviewed the 2002 incident, as required by 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.16(c)(3)(i), along with improved country conditions, in making their
determination that it was not likely for the government to acquiesce in any torture upon
his return, Smith could not prove his case under the CAT standard. See Green, 694 F.3d
at 507. Accordingly, the IJ was not required to address whether the 2002 incident
6
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involved acquiescence by the police. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976)
(“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the
decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
B
Smith also contends that the IJ and BIA ignored probative evidence of likely
future torture: a letter submitted to the IJ by his mother, Veronica Smith, expressing fear
for her son’s safety in Jamaica based on threats she heard. Smith claims it was legal error
for the IJ and BIA to fail to “mention the letter from [his] mother explaining that, on trips
to Jamaica she had taken since [he] was incarcerated in 2010, she was approached” and
told that “if he was to be sent back to Jamaica [she] would be buying a black dress.”
Smith Br. 23.
Smith is right that “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture” must
be considered. Pieschacon-Villegas, 671 F.3d 303, 313 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16(c)(3)) (finding BIA at fault for not considering several pieces of evidence,
including “threats allegedly made against [the petitioner] and his family”). The IJ and
BIA “lack[] authority to ignore” any evidence relevant to future torture. Id. at 314. In
applying this rule, we have reversed BIA decisions when they “totally ignore[] the most
forceful record evidence” supporting the petitioner. Kang v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 157,
166 (3d Cir. 2010) (several clear instances of past torture).
At the same time, an IJ’s opinion need “not specifically discuss every individual
piece of evidence.” Green, 694 F.3d at 509. It suffices if the IJ accepts lengthy testimony
7
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from the petitioner along with all of his “submitted documentary evidence,” and makes
“clear that [he] had ‘considered all of the evidence of record.’” Id. at 509 (alterations and
citation omitted).
In this case, although the IJ didn’t discuss Smith’s mother’s letter in his oral
decision, he unquestionably accepted it as documentary evidence. While reviewing all
submitted evidence during the hearing, the IJ stated “there appears to be a letter from
Veronica Smith.” App. 54. Smith then asked the IJ whether he had the letter. The IJ
confirmed receipt of the letter and admitted it into evidence. And after Smith’s testimony,
shortly before the IJ “dictate[d] [his] oral decision,” the IJ told Smith: “I appreciate all
the documents that you submitted and your testimony today.” App. 104 (emphasis
added). As in Green, the presumption applies that when an IJ states that he reviewed the
record, he actually “consider[ed] all relevant record evidence in rendering [his] decision.”
694 F.3d at 508.
In any event, the letter from Smith’s mother was not so important as to require an
in-depth discussion to demonstrate that the IJ “truly performed a full review of the
record.” Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 388 (3d Cir. 2010). The letter recounts
threats from anonymous private actors and does not rebut the IJ’s conclusion—after
looking at country conditions and reports from both sides—that the government is not
likely to acquiesce in violence against Smith.
We are satisfied both that the IJ did evaluate the letter along with all other record
evidence and that the IJ and BIA were not required to specifically discuss it given their
8
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other conclusions regarding the absence of government acquiescence in any future
torture. And to the extent that Smith “quarrels over the exercise of discretion” to not
discuss the letter at length, this contention doesn’t raise a question of law. Cospito v. Att’y
Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
IV
We have considered all of Smith’s other arguments and find them unmeritorious.
Accordingly, we will dismiss Smith’s petition for review.
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